Marquette Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 1 November 1931

Article 8

Equity - Adjoining Landowners - Encroachments
Dorothy N. Korthal

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Dorothy N. Korthal, Equity - Adjoining Landowners - Encroachments, 16 Marq. L. Rev. 59 (1931).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol16/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

CASE NOTES

it represents another unpunished crime. Against the reasons advanced
in the decision, several criticisms may be projected. At the outset, conceding the status of the Indian as a ward, it is only reasonable that he
should be protected as fully as possible, and not, if possible, by half
way measures. Since Congress has failed to protect him as against all
but eight major offences, what sound reason can be adduced against
the state's filling the gap, and providing for the punishment for the
other offences? None has been brought forward, except that since the
Indian is not highly civilized, modern complex laws made for highly
civilized society, should not be imposed on him. But it must not be
forgotten that while this argument was unassailable a hundred years
ago, it has lost most of its strength, until today it is of very doubtful
force, in view of the increased civilization among the Indians. Then
too, it is doubtful whether our modern criminal laws are actually so
much more complex and more unsuited to a "primitive" people than
were the laws of several hundred years ago.
It has been said further that the-states shall not legislate on this
subject since that is a matter exclusively for Congress. This exclusive
right is rested on the theory that the Indians are wards of the United
States, owe no allegiance to the states, and, what is more important,
receive no protection from the states. But even conceding so broad a
statement that the State does not protect the Indian, is it not largely
because the federal government has taken from the states the right
to legislate as to the Indian that the states are not offering the Indian
the protection to which he may be entitled?
While the writer has no reason fervently to espouse the cause of
the Indian, yet it seems to him that a humanitarian public policy should
dictate fuller protection of the Indian. The present state of the law
falls short of this. But state legislation would seem constitutionally
possible, and not at all unsatisfactory.
M. WESLEY KuswA.

In the case
of Fisher vs. Godman, et al., 237 N.W. 93 (Wis.), the plaintiff sought
to obtain a mandatory injunction ordering the defendants to remove a
part of their building which protruded into the soil of her lot. The
complaint alleged that, in the process of constructing an apartment
building on their own property, the defendants excavated and removed
a portion of her lot and built the heavy foundation and wall which
projected into her land and which the defendants claimed they had a
right to maintain. It further alleged that the plaintiff was thereby prevented from the full use and enjoyment of her property, that the value
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of it had greatly diminished, and that she had suffered damage because
of such encroachment. Defendants demurred on the ground that the
complaint did not state such facts as would entitle plaintiff to equitable
relief.
The court found no difficulty in overruling the demurrer, but hesitated upon the question whether relief should be equitable or in the
form of ejectment.
The general rule upon that question is stated in 14 A.L.R. 831
to be that "Mandatory injunction is a proper remedy for a landowner
to invoke against an adjoining owner to compel the removal of structures which encroach upon complainant's land." The application of the
rule to particular cases in Wisconsin may be traced historically by an
examination of the cases decided within this state.
One of the first of these cases, McCourt vs. Eckstein, 22 Wis. 148,
*153, 94 Am. Dec. 594, held that, where some of the stones of defendant's foundation wall projected 8 inches over plainti's land, plaintiff
might treat this as a disseisin rather than a trespass, and might maintain ejectment. But if, when plaintiff excavated for his wall adjoining
that of defendant, the latter offered to remove the projecting stones,
so as to give plaintiff full possession, and was prevented by him from
so doing, the action could not be maintained.
The next case directly in point is Zander vs. Valentine Blatz Brewing Co., 95 Wis. 162, 70 N.W. 164, which is an action in ejectment
to recover 14 inches of plaintiff's land occupied by the defendant
through excavation and the erection of a building foundation and wall.
Here, however, the plaintiff had always been in full possession of his
entire lot, for he had built his own building upon defendant's wall and
continued to use it as a support for his own building. Such possession
precluded the action of ejectment and made the action necessarily one
of trespass.
Rahn vs. The Milwaukee Electric Railway and Light Co., 103 Wis.
467, 79 N.W. 747, resembles the latter case very closely. Though the
protruding foundation wall was built and maintained without plaintiffs consent and against her protest, the plaintiff could not maintain
ejectment, because the wall was erected in such a manner as to project
under her own building, which extended to the true boundary line.
The only case to the contrary is Beck vs. Ashland Cigar and
Tobacco Co., 146 Wis. 324, 130 N.W. 464, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 239,
which holds that an invasion of the surface of the soil by a protruding
wall constitutes disseisin, and that the remedy of ejectment is exclusive.
This holding is expressly overruled by the case at bar.
In addition to these pertinent Wisconsin cases, the court considered
Hahi vs. Sugo, 169 N.Y. 109, 62 N.E. 135, 61 L.R.A. 226, 88 Am. St.
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Rep. 539, and Hirschberg vs. Flusser, 87 N.J. Eq. 588, 101 A 191,
in arriving at its decision. In the former case, the plaintiff had recovered in an action in ejectment for the land encroached upon, execution had issued, and the sheriff had returned the execution as impossible of performance. A motion was then made and denied to compel
the defendant to remove the wall. Afterwards the equitable action was
begun and an order was entered, directing the defendant to remove
the wall. On second appeal, this judgment was reversed on the ground
that the judgment in the previous action was a bar to the maintenance
of the equitable action. In the latter case, the sheriff had been unable
to remove the encroachment, because a large part of the wall which
protruded into the plaintiff's land was built with stones so large that
they not only encroached upon plaintiff's land, but extended into and
formed part of the wall of the defendant's building on his own land,
and it was impossible to remove that encroachment without trespassing
upon the defendant's land and injuring his building. The legal action,
however did not prevent the plaintiff from subsequently obtaining a.
decree in equity, as it did in New York.
Judge Owen, in writing the opinion of the case at bar, says, "It
seems to be the settled law of this state that where a wall of an
adjoining property owner protrudes into the soil of the premises of
the plaintiff, the latter may have either equitable relief or treat the
invasion as a disseisin and have the remedy of ejectment." (McCourt
vs. Eckstein, Zander vs. Valentine Blatz Brewing Co., and Rahn vs.
The Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co., supra, accord.)
The Wisconsin court has held disseisin to be either (1) in spite
of the owner or (2) at his election. McCourt vs. Eckstein, supra. The
first is disseisin in fact, i. e., such open, known, exclusive, adverse, and
uninterrupted dispossession of the true owner as would render it an
absolute title in fee after the passage of the statutory number of years.
The second is disseisin in construction of law. "Where an act is done,
which is equivocal, and may be either a trespass or disseisin according
to the intent, there the law will not permit the wrong-doer to qualify
his own wrong, and to explain it to be a mere trespass, unless the
owner elects so to consider it." McCourt vs. Eckstein, supra. Disseisin
in fact is unquestionably ground for an action in ejectment; disseisin in
construction of law may give rise either to ejectment or to trespass,
as the owner chooses. The latter action implies that there has been
intrusion upon the plaintiff's land, either above or below the surface,
and that his possession has been otherwise undisturbed. Ejectment
implies both intrusion and dispossession.
"The theory upon which a mandatory injunction is held a proper
remedy is in brief the inadequacy of the remedies at law." 14 A.L.R.

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

838. That the enforcement, by the sheriff, of a judgment in a legal
action is unreasonable and often impossible is shown by the two
cases above cited. (Hahl vs. Sugo, and Hirschberg vs. Flusser.) A
sheriff is guilty of trespass if in removing the invading portion of a wall
or foundation he invades by a hair line the property of the defendant.
"The proceeding is as delicate and impracticable as the taking of the
pound of flesh. The responsibility of removing the wall should, in justice, be left to the party who built it, and this the remedy of mandatory
injunction does." Fisher vs. Goodman, supra. Therefore, ejectment is
inadequate. Trespass, on the other hand, gives immediate relief in damages, but that relief is not final, and a continuing trespass is merely the
source of a multiplicity of actions.
Since both of these possibly remedies are easily proved inadequate,
the court holds that equity must give relief, and decrees that the order
overruling the demurrer shall be affirmed.
DOROTHY N.

KORTHAL.

EQUITY-SALES-INJUNCTION. E. L. Hustings Co. vs. Coca Cola
Co. et al., 237 N.W. 85 (Wis.). The named defendants in this action
were the Coca Cola Co., Western Coca Cola Botting Co., Wisconsin
Coca Cola Bottling Co., and Milwaukee Coca Cola Bottling Co. In a
previous action brought by the Hustings Co. against the Western Coca
Cola Bottling Co., the Hustings Co. was defeated, and their attempts to
include the Western Co. in this suit were unsuccessful. There was
only a contractual relation between the named defendants, with the
exception of the Wisconsin and Milwaukee Coca Cola Bottling companies. The Milwaukee Co. is a subsidiary of the Wisconsin Co.
This suit was brought by the E. L. Hustings Co., a Wisconsin
corporation, against the defendants in equity, to enjoin the defendants
from an unlawful interference with plaintiff's rights acquired under a
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant Western Coca Cola
Bottling Co., whereby the plaintiff was given exclusive right to purchase Coca Cola syrup for bottling purposes, to bottle and sell bottled
Coca Cola, and to use the trade-mark, trade name, labels, etc. in Milwaukee County. The contract stated among other things, that the
Hustings Co. was to use a minimum of 2,000 gallons of syrup per year,
that they should sell no ther product that was a substitute for Coca
Cola, and that they should vigorously push the sale of Coca Cola, and
that if they failed to push the sales, the Western Coca Cola Bottling
Co. would terminate the contract. There were two contracts, the second
a renewal of the original contract. At no time during the existence of

